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Is there a ‘Conservative’ Counter-Terrorism? 
 
Lydia Morgan and Fiona de Londras1 
 
Every government has its own impact on policy, but no government starts from a 
blank page. As was the case with the Labour governments that came before them, 
the Conservative and Conservative-led governments since 2010 have found 
themselves contending with security and counter-terrorism. In so doing they have, 
we will argue, largely extended three clear trends from the Labour governments 
that went before: a focus on prevention, an embrace of surveillance, and a 
manifestation of human rights scepticism in the counter-terrorism context.  
 
While these trends are all extensions of Labour commitments, discernible from the 
'state of play' in 2010, they are also themselves updated extensions of much of2 the 
Conservative approach to countering violence in Northern Ireland.3 Indeed, as we 
will show below, in terms of laws and policies there is no clear Conservative or 
Labour approach to countering terrorism; instead, the development of counter-
terrorism law since 2001 reveals a marked convergence of views and approaches 
between Labour and the Conservatives and the emergence of counter-terrorism as a 
rare point of bipartisan agreement. The underpinning reasons for this apparent 
convergence and bipartisanship may well differ between the parties, but the effects in 
terms of law are not clearly distinguishable between them.  
 
The implications of this, we argue, are that a reorientation of counter-terrorism law 
and policy in the UK towards rights and away from control requires more than 
party political change: when it comes to counter-terrorism, a change of government 
does not mean a change of governance. Instead, such a reorientation requires a 
radical rupturing of the current counter-terrorist consensus and a dispositional shift 
towards security, risk, and rights.                                                          
1 Research Fellow, Birmingham Law School; Professor of Global Legal Studies, Birmingham Law 
School, University of Birmingham. 
2 We do not consider the use of lethal force here, which was a substantial part of security operations 
in Northern Ireland. For a comprehensive account see Fionnuala ní Aoláin, The Politics of Force: 
Conflict Management and State violence in Northern Ireland (2000, Belfast; Blackstaff Press). 
3 For a broad account see the essays in James Dingley (ed), Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland 
(2009, Abingdon; Routledge). 
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Part I. Counter-Terrorism under New Labour 1997-2010 
 
Tony Blair’s Labour government came to power at a time when the primary focus of 
UK counter-terrorism was Northern Ireland. At that time, in 1997, the Peace 
Process was advancing, but by no means completed, and there was a panoply of 
exceptional powers and legislation, applying only to Northern Ireland, that 
constituted much of the UK’s counter-terrorism law corpus. It is rather striking to 
think now that the word ‘terrorism’ appeared only once in the Labour Party’s 
manifesto in 19974 and then in connection only with a commitment to the UK’s full 
participation in NATO: international terrorism simply was not on the agenda, and 
terrorist violence in Northern Ireland seemed to be drawing to a close. 
 
A key aim for Labour was the normalisation of existing counter-terrorism provisions 
and powers, and the creation instead of stable and generally applicable counter-
terrorism law.5 This was largely achieved with the Terrorism Act 2000, which was 
barely dry on its velum when the attacks of 11 September 2001 took place. However, 
in spite of having just introduced such a comprehensive piece of legislation, and 
having ‘brought rights home’6 in the Human Rights Act 1998, the Labour 
government’s response to the attacks of 9/11 was to focus, not only on international 
military action and cooperative activity with the United States, but also on the 
development of a new legislative arsenal at home. The Government entered a 
derogation to Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the only 
Council of Europe state to do so in response to the attacks—and proceeded to 
introduce, at lightning quick speed,7 the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. As will become clear throughout this section, this marked the start of a 
zealous New Labour approach to domestic counter-terrorism, which had as a key 
focus (i) prevention, (ii) surveillance, and (iii) human rights exceptionalism. In this 
the Blairites were hardly forging a new approach to counter-terrorism: rather, they 
                                                        
4 Labour Party, New Labour because Britain Deserves Better (1997). 
5 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Secretary of State for the Home Office, Legislation 
against Terrorism: A Consultation Paper (1998, London; HM Stationary Office). 
6 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (1997, 
London; HM Stationary Office); Human Rights Act 1998. 
7 For analysis see Helen Fenwick, “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A 
Proportionate Response to 11 September?” (2002) 65(5) Modern Law Review 724-762. 
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were largely continuing some well-documented trends from Northern Ireland, but in 
their new rights-soaked constitutional atmosphere, and in the absence of any 
apparent threat to the United Kingdom per se, this in itself was noteworthy, as was 





The Blair government was hardly alone in identifying prevention as a core counter-
terrorist goal: the EU’s immediate response to the 9/11 attacks, for example, made 
prevention one its core goals,8 and it also enjoyed a prominent place in UN Security 
Council Resolutions that closely followed the attacks.9 However, at the domestic 
level of UK legislation and policy the commitment to prevention took on four 
particular forms that, as we will see in Part II, are still present—in one form or 
another—in contemporary UK counter-terrorism. 
 
The first of these is prevention by means of deprivation of liberty, the underpinning 
theory being that by restricting the physical liberty of a suspected terrorist one 
undermines his ability to act on terroristic intentions. For the Blair government the 
starting point on this front was detention without charge or trial for non-UK citizen 
suspected terrorists, with appeals (to the extent that they could be so described) 
being heard in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. This repressive 
detention regime was ultimately found incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
1998 in the famous Belmarsh case,10 and with the European Convention on Human 
Rights in A v United Kingdom,11 but it importantly took a (failed) tactic from 
counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland (internment), adapted it to the post-9/11 
UK-wide landscape (in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001), planting 
a seed in UK-wide law that, although now modified, has grown obstinate roots. Once 
the incompatibility of the detention without trial regime had been identified, the                                                         
8 Council of the European Union, Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary 
European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001 (Brussels: Council of the European Union, Document 
12019/01, 2001) and subsequently the Council of the European Union, Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on combating terrorism (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2002/475/JHA, 2002) 
9 UN Security Council Resolution 1368; UN Security Council Resolution 1373; UN Security Council 
Resolution 1377 
10 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
11 A and Others v the United Kingdom, (2009) [GC] ECHR 301, 3455/05 
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Labour government—rather than abandon its commitment to prevention through 
deprivation of liberty—adjusted its mechanism, replacing the ATCSA regime with 
control orders12 and protracted periods of detention before charge, even trying 
(unsuccessfully) to extend that to an unprecedented 90 days of pre-charge 
detention.13 These control orders were, in some ways, less repressive (they did not 
usually, for example, result in imprisonment per se) and in other ways more so (they 
infringed into the home, could restrict contact and association, and were applicable 
to everyone in the UK, not only non-citizens).14  
 
A second preventative focus was on prevention through exclusion. Again, this was 
limited to non-UK citizens, and was a commitment, primarily manifested through 
policy rather than embedded in new counter-terrorism legislation, to the deportation 
of ‘foreign’ suspected terrorists, largely on the basis of a determination by the Home 
Secretary that deportation would be conducive to the public good.15 This was in 
some ways connected with the ATCSA detention regime, that having been 
presented as a way to protect the public against terrorist threats posed by suspected 
terrorists who could not be deported because of the risk that they would be 
subjected to human rights abuses in their home or receiving state.16 International 
human rights law imposes a general duty of non-refoulement,17 and in the context of 
the European Convention on Human Rights there was an absolute obligation under 
Article 3 not to exclude anyone to a country where there was a real risk that their 
rights under Article 3 might be violated.18 That obligation had existed for some 
years, and the Court had affirmed its applicability in the context of security-related 
deportation Chahal v United Kingdom.19 This, however, was a rule that the Blair 
government thought needed to be adjusted in light of the ‘new’ threat posed by                                                         
12 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,  
13 Patrick Wintour, “After eight years in power Tony Blair hears a new word: defeat”, The Guardian, 
10 November 2005. 
14 For an argument that A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
expanded rights-restrictions to all, rather than limiting restrictions on rights, see e.g. David Jenkins, 
“When good cases go bad: unintended consequences of rights-friendly judgments” in Fergal F Davis 
& Fiona de Londras (eds), Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review (2014, Cambridge; 
CUP), 75. 
15 s. 3(5)(6), Immigration Act 1971. 
16 See the arguments of the United Kingdom in A v United Kingdom, above n. 11. 
17 For a thorough account see, e.g., Jean Allain, “The Jus cogens nature of non-refoulement” (2001) 13(4) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 533-558. 
18 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413; Soering v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 439. 
19 Chahal v United Kingdom ibid. 
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‘radical Islamists’ such as Al Qaeda and associated forces. Rather quickly after the 
9/11 attacks, the Prime Minister made it clear that he thought this rule needed 
revising, and a process of deporting suspected terrorists was commenced, often with 
some assurances as to human rights protection, but not necessarily assurances that 
were thought to fulfill the requirements of human rights law.20 This was something 
of a departure: the context of counter-terrorism operations in Northern Ireland was 
such that deportation was not ordinarily a matter for consideration in policy terms, 
the suspects or culprits largely being UK citizens or, if not, Irish citizens. Now, 
however, the threat was perceived as external; as emanating from non-citizens, 
without a duty of allegiance to the Crown and state, and who could be externalised 
(and thus the materialisation of the threat hopefully averted) by simple removal of 
the perceived threat from the United Kingdom. This could be done without reaching 
the high threshold of proof required in a criminal trial.  
 
While non-citizen suspected terrorists could be removed from the territory under 
the Blair government’s assessment, their ability to radicalise citizens was considered 
to be significant. Counter-radicalisation, and de-radicalisation, were placed center 
stage in the preventative turn, and it was the Blair government that introduced 
CONTEST in 2003.21 Again, the UK was hardly alone in this: countering 
radicalisation is a central commitment at EU and international level as well,22 and a 
whole industry in devising mechanisms of achieving this aim sprang up at home and 
abroad,23 with significant resources committed to developing, implementing, and 
supporting programmes and approaches to counter-radicalisation. Such a 
development was also, of course, the subject of criticism, not least for its reliance on 
largely discredited ‘escalator theories’ of radicalisation,24 but the policy commitment                                                         
20 See David Anderson (with Clive Walker), Deportation with Assurances (2017), Cm 9462, Chapter 1 
for an account of the early attempts to resolve what Anderson therein calls “the Chahal dilemma”. 
Blair quickly adopted the position that the UK may withdraw from the ECHR or amend the Human 
Rights Act 1998 if memoranda of understanding to facilitate deportation of suspected terrorists were 
not accepted by courts: Ned Temko & Jamie Doward, “Revealed: Blair attack on human rights law”, 
The Guardian, 14 May 2006. 
21 Home Office, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, (Cm 6888, 2006)   
22 For a thorough analysis see Edwin Bakker, “EU Counter-radicalization Policies: A Comprehensive 
and Consistent Approach?” (2015) 30 Intelligence and National Security 281-305. 
23 For an analysis see Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept” (2012) 54(2) Race 
and Class 3-25. 
24 See for example Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism: Second Report of Session 
2016-17 (2016). See also the Government’s response, rejecting this criticism: Counter-Extremism: 
Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2016-17 (2016), esp. p.p 7-8. 
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to reach beyond the criminal law and into every part of social life—faith 
communities, schools, the health service, neighbourhoods, sports clubs etc—in order 
to inculcate ‘British values’,25 a commitment to which might make one resilient to 
the radicalising and glorifying speech of ‘extremists’ took deep root, largely 
implemented through the CONTEST policy. 
 
CONTEST was intended to be a comprehensive, “pan-governmental”,26 and “long-
term strategy for countering international terrorism”.27 Reflecting this, it has four 
axes: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Pursue largely describes the 
Government’s prosecutorial policy. Prevent focuses on identifying potential terrorist 
plots and utilizing broad intelligence and surveillance powers to detect and stop 
persons who might be ‘vulnerable’ to developing terrorist ‘sympathies’, including by 
“[e]ngaging in the battle of ideas—challenging the ideologies that extremists 
believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to 
dispute these ideas to do so”.28 Protect seeks to minimize exposure and weakness to 
terror attacks by strengthening security, particularly at Borders and on the 
transport network. Prepare focuses on mitigating the impact of an attack. Although 
initially conceived by the Home Office in 2003 under David Blunkett,29 the policy 
was only made public in 2006 under Charles Clarke30 and following the July 7th 2005 
attacks in Central London. At that time, the emphasis was shifted decisively to 
‘prevent’, which was construed not only as a government activity but as “a battle of 
ideas in which success will depend upon all parts of the community challenging the 
ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence”.31 Prevention, then, was 
construed not only as a key element of countering terrorism undertaken through 
law alone, but as a combination of legal and non-legal instruments aimed collectively 
at “addressing structural problems in the UK and elsewhere that may contribute to                                                         
25 See the proposal for the development of a Statement of British Values in the Governance of Britain: 
Green Paper (2007; Cabinet Office). For a critique see e.g. Orla Lynch, “British Muslim Youth: 
radicalisation, terrorism and the construction of the ‘other’” (2013) 6(2) Critical Studies on Terrorism 
241-261; Carol Johnson, “The politics of affective citizenship: from Blair to Obama” (2010) 14 
Citizenship Studies 495-509. 
26 Home Affairs Select Committee, Project CONTEST: The Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 
(HC 2008-2009, 212), 4. 
27 Home Office, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, (Cm 6888, 2006), 1. 
28 Ibid, 2. 
29 Ibid; see also John Gearson and Hugo Rosemont “CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's 
Counterterrorism Approach” (2015) 38(12) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 1038-1064. 
30 Home Office, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, (Cm 6888, 2006). 
31 Ibid, 3. 
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radicalisation”.32 Criminal offences (discussed further below) were intended to deter 
those who facilitate terrorism and targeted activities in prisons and other areas 
where a high risk of radicalisation is perceived to exist sought to challenge 
ideological motivations of extremists through work with and within communities, 
and through international activity and support for Muslim communities in order to 
“counter extremists’ false characterisation of the UK as…a place where Muslims are 
oppressed”.33 
The ‘prevent’ strand of CONTEST illustrates the expansive approach to counter-
terrorism promoted and implemented by the New Labour government; an approach 
that focused on prevention by all means, including but going well beyond the 
creation and implementation of legal instruments per se. The 2009 published version, 
colloquially known as ‘CONTEST 2,’34 was more detailed, partly because it was seen 
as a Public Service Agreement (PSA) outlining targets to enable progress 
monitoring,35 however its emphasis on PREVENT remained, as did the criticism of 
it, particularly because of its perceived targeting of Muslim communities.36 
The fourth key strand to New Labour’s commitment to preventing terrorism was 
the creation and promulgation of preventative offences, intervening at a notably 
remote stage from any terrorist acts. This had begun prior to the attacks of 11 
September 2001 in the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act, which was to act as 
comprehensive counter-terrorism legislation for the whole of the United Kingdom,37 
included the continuation of some broadly preventive approaches such as 
proscription,38 and the criminalisation of membership of,39 support for,40 and the 
manifestation of support for a proscribed organisation through wearing or 
displaying uniform in public.41 Proscribed organisations were expanded to include                                                         
32 Ibid, 11. 
33 Ibid, 16. 
34 Ibid. 
35 National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, Cm 7291, 2008 
36 Arun Kundani, Spooked: How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, (2009, London; Institute of Race 
Relations); Home Affairs Select Committee, Roots of Violent Radicalisation (HC 2010-12, 1446); Imran 
Awan ‘’I am a Muslim not an extremist’: How the Prevent strategy has constructed a ‘suspect’ 
community” (2012) 6 Policy and Politics 1158-1185. 
37 Although c.f. Part VII, Terrorism Act 2000, on Northern Ireland. 
38 Part II, Terrorism Act 2000 as originally enacted. 
39 s. 11, Terrorism Act 2000 as originally enacted. 
40 s. 12, Terrorism Act 2000 as originally enacted. 
41 s. 13, Terrorism Act 2000 as originally enacted. 
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international terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda.42 Criminal offences were expanded 
to include possession of “an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, 
preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”,43 and the collection or making of 
“a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism”44 or the possession of a document or record of that 
kind.45 The Terrorism Act 2006 greatly expanded this preventive focus. This 
criminalised the direct or indirect encouragement of the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism,46 the dissemination of terrorist publications,47 and 
(to much criticism) the glorification of terrorism. The Act spread the net widely: for 
example, attendance at a place used for terrorism training if he knows or believes 
that training is being provided there or if a person attending there “could not 
reasonably have failed to understand” what was going on there.48 It is no defence 
that the person in question was not receiving the instruction or training;49 presence 
is sufficient to attract criminal liability. It also expanded the basis for proscribing 
organisation to include organisations that promote or encourage terrorism. 
Surveillance 
A second dominant theme of the New Labour approach to counter-terrorism was an 
embrace of surveillance. Again, this predates the attacks of September 2001, but 
intensified following those attacks. 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) was the first 
comprehensive regulatory regime governing surveillance, the interception of 
communications and the decryption of encrypted material. Like the Terrorism Act 
2000, it was part of the process of regularising counter-terrorism powers, including 
creating at least some form of oversight, to mark a transition from Northern Irish 
exceptionalism and towards the normalisation of counter-terrorism within the 
general legislative acquis. It replaced the heavily criticised Interception of                                                         
42 See also s. 21, Terrorism Act 2006 as originally enacted. 
43 s. 57, Terrorism Act 2000. 
44 s. 58(1)(a), Terrorism Act 2000. 
45 s. 58(1)(b), Terrorism Act 2000. 
46 s. 1, Terrorism Act 2006 as originally enacted. 
47 s. 2, Terrorism Act 2006 as originally enacted. 
48 s. 8, Terrorism Act 2006 as originally enacted. 
49 s. 8(3), Terrorism Act 2006 as originally enacted. 
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Communication Act 1985 (IOCA 1985). Before the IOCA 1985 most interception of 
communication had taken place using prerogative powers but following Malone50 a 
more comprehensive framework was called for. RIPA was intended to ensure 
investigatory powers accords with Article 8 privacy rights as “[d]isproportionate, 
or unfettered, use of interception can have consequences” for individual rights.”51  
RIPA regulated six types of investigatory power: the interception of communication; 
the acquisition of communications data; intrusive surveillance; directed covert 
surveillance (non-intrusive surveillance); the use of Covert Human Intelligence 
Sources (CHIS)52; and access to encrypted data.  Described by a former Director of 
GCHQ David Omand as providing “full legislative coverage” in regards to rights,53 
the central motivation for new regulation was less about rights and more about the 
ability to compel access to the growing amount of digital encrypted material.54  
Omand has also suggested that RIPA “embodies the principles of proportionality 
through differing levels of request and approval” by carefully calibrating “intrusive 
operations with seniority.”55  At the apex of the seniority chain is the Secretary of 
State and the Prime Minister, which means the responsibility for rights protection 
sits in same hands as those who are also responsible for counter-terrorism and 
security.  For these reasons, others have been more critical of RIPA’s from a human 
rights perspective,56 but in spite of that the trend since its passage has resolutely 
been towards more and more intensive surveillance rather than less.  
The approach to surveillance accords with the preventative agenda. For example, 
surveillance originating from intercepted communications is not admissible in court, 
                                                        
50 Malone v Metropolitian Police Commissioner (no 2) [1979] Chancery Division 344 
51 Home Office, Interception of Communications in the United Kingdom: A Consultation Paper, (Cm 
4368,1999) 
52 Schedules 1 and 2, RIPA 2000 
53 David Omand, ‘Ethical Guidelines in using secret intelligence for public security’ in Andrew, 
Aldrich and Wark (eds) Secret Intelligence: A Reader, (2009, Abingdon; Routledge) 395-410, 402 
54 Bela Bonita Chatterjee, ‘New but not improved: a critical examination of revisions to the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 encryption provisions’ (2011) 19(3) International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology 264-284, 264 
55 David Omand, ‘Ethical Guidelines in using secret intelligence for public security’ in Andrew, 
Aldrich and Wark (eds) Secret Intelligence: A Reader, (2009, Abingdon; Routledge) 395-410, 402 
56 Jemima Stratford, ‘Changes needed in the law’ in Moore (ed) RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, 
and the Inadequacies of our Existing Legal Framework [Record of Roundtable discussion], (2014) 
85(2) The Political Quarterly 128-129; see also Hiral Bhatt ‘RIPA 2000: A human rights examination’ 
(2006) 10(3) The International Journal of Human Rights 285-314. 
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while other similar forms such as recordings from a concealed microphone are.57  
Whatever the background ethics of this kind of investigation measure, from a rights 
perspective the ban on intercept evidence repeats the damage done to privacy as 
substantial portions of an investigation will not be disclosed to the accused or, where 
the evidentiary threshold cannot be met, preventative measures are used instead.  
The basis of the ban is, apparently, the protection of operational methods,58  but one 
outcome is that fewer prosecutions take place.59   
Multiple reviews in the New Labour period (and continued in under the coalition, 
see more below) argued for the ban on intercepted evidence should be overturned.60  
Blair was not in favour, although Brown initiated a subsequent review in 2007/8.61  
The Privy Council Review led by Sir John Chilcot, outlined nine operational 
requirements which would enable the use of intercept evidence.62 One required that 
intercept only be seen by cleared judges, prosecutors, or special (defence), which 
accounts for the growth in Closed Material Procedures (CMPs)63 and employment 
of Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates to protect the origin of and operational 
aspects of sensitive information.64  CMPs were eventually contentiously extended to 
civil procedures Justice and Security Act 2013 in response to Al Rawi65 when the 
Supreme Court ruled that CMPs could not be used in ordinary civil cases which 
resulted in the government settling with Binyam Mohammed and other ex-
Guantanamo detainees who brought the claim.66 
                                                        
57 Between 2000 and 2016 the relevant provisions were s 17 RIPA 2000, repeating provisions from 
the s 9 Interception of Communications Act 1985. 
58 James Brokenshire, Intercept as Evidence (HC Deb 17 December 2014 124W)  
59 Silkie Carlo, 5 Reasons why we need intercept evidence in court, (Liberty blog, 2016) (available at 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/blog/5-reasons-why-we-need-intercept-evidence-
court ) 
60 See Annex C of HM Government, Intercept as Evidence, (Cm 8989, 2014)  
61 Stuart MacDonald ‘Prosecuting Suspected Terrorists: Precursor Crimes, Intercept Evidence and 
the Priority of Security’ in Stuart McDonald (ed), Critical Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism, (2015, 
Abingdon; Routledge) 130-149, 138. 
62 Privy Council, Privy Council Review on Intercept as Evidence, (Cm 7324, 2008) para 208, 49 
63 s. 40(2) and 40(5), Constitutional Reform Act 2005, as relied on in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (No. 1) [2013] UKSC 38; other counter-terrorism actions in respect of which CMPs can be 
used are outlined in Part 6 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. 
64 Under part 1, s 18(7) RIPA 2000 (among other provisions). 
65 Al Rawi and others v The Security Service and others [2011] UKSC 34 
66 Adam Wagner, “Government ‘pays out’ Al Rawi mistreatment claimants”, UK Human Right Blog, 
16 November 2010 (available at https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2010/11/16/government-pays-
out-al-rawi-mistreatment-claims/ ) 
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Following the 2001 attacks, and those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) the 
focus on surveillance intensified. In particular, there was considerable concern that 
the use by terrorists of mobile telecommunications devices was enabling the evasion 
of conventional surveillance mechanisms and “reaffirmed…the need to adopt 
common measures on the retention of telecommunications data as soon as 
possible”.67 This was not a new concern: as Jones and Hayes have shown,68 demands 
for such data retention on the international level can be traced back to at least 1993, 
when the very first Council of Justice and Home Affairs resulted in a Resolution of 
Ministers of Justice calling for research into the need for telecommunications 
interception in Europe.69 Following a number of unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
a Framework Directive on data retention at EU level,70 the 2005 London attacks 
resulted in the imposition by the Presidency of the EU Council—at that time held by 
the UK—of a deadline for the adoption of such a Directive and a ‘robust’ approach 
by the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, to ‘persuading’ the European 
Parliament to support the proposal,71 which it ultimately did on 14 December 2005. 
The Data Retention Directive then passed into law in March 2006. Interestingly, 
the UK’s desire to pass EU-level data retention law followed a failed attempt to 
introduce mandatory data retention in domestic law. As part of the Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001, the government had attempted to introduce 
mandatory data retention but was limited to the Home Secretary introducing a 
voluntary code of conduct for data retention, which was not adopted by many 
telecommunications providers.72 The EU Data Retention Directive, then, 
remedied—in the eyes of the government—this failure in domestic law, requiring 
the retention by all telecommunications providers of metadata to be made available 
to law enforcement agencies investigating serious crime. As predicted by many 
NGOs at the time, the Court of Justice of the European Union ultimately stuck 
                                                        
67 Preamble, para 10, Directive 2006/24/EC (Data Retention Directive). 
68 Chris Jones and Ben Hayes, ‘The EU Data Retention Directive: A Case Study in the Legitimacy 
and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy’ (2013, SECILE). 
69 Permanent Representatives Committee (Part 2), ‘Interception of telecommunications’, 10090/93, 
16 November 1993, (available at http://database.statewatch.org/e-library/1994-jha-k4-03-06.pdf ); 
held in the Statewatch European Monitoring and Documentation Centre (SEMDOC) JHA Archive, 
(available at http://www.statewatch.org/semdoc/jha-archive.html ) 
70 See the analysis in Jones and Hayes, above n 68, p.p. 6-9. 
71 See the analysis in Jones and Hayes, ibid, at 9. 
72 Voluntary Code of Practice on Data Retention on 5 December 2003, Statutory Instrument 
2003/3175. 
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down the Data Retention Directive73 but, as we will see in Part II, its legacy remains 
in UK law. 
Human Rights Exceptionalism 
In spite of having introduced the Human Rights Act in 1998, the New Labour 
government found its commitment to rights-protection challenged in the wake of 
the 2001 attacks. We have already seen that its commitment to prevention included, 
for example, the preventative detention and deportation of foreign suspected 
terrorists, and the introduction of extensive blanket surveillance through its efforts 
on the EU level. All of these approaches raised clear questions of human rights 
compliance, both at home and abroad. In respect of human rights ‘at home’ the 
Labour government’s starting point was to derogate from Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and to claim that the measures introduced thereafter 
were within those “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”74 and so 
compliant with the Convention. A significant element in substantiating this claim 
was the proceduralisation of rights for suspected terrorists: rather than allow 
suspected terrorists detained under the 2001 Act to select their own lawyers and to 
be told of the case against them, the system of Special Advocates was introduced for 
such detainees through which lawyers with approved security clearance could be 
assigned to defendants, told the case against their client, and then be required to 
represent them which revealing to them no more than the ‘gist’ of the case against 
them. While on the face of it this raises clear questions of compliance with Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights it was, in fact, found to be sufficient 
to satisfy those rights, even after the UK’s derogation had been lifted. Similarly, 
control orders—which replaced detention under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act—were considered to be compliant with Article 5 in principle, although 
the terms of specific control orders were considered at times to go beyond what was 
permissible. In all such cases the key to a finding of human rights compliance was 
the existence of procedural safeguards, just as had been the case in respect of detention 
and investigation of suspected terrorists in Northern Ireland, notwithstanding the 
well-documented insufficiency of those safeguards from a practical perspective. In 
this, the Labour government clearly succeeded in its ‘internal challenge’ to human                                                         
73 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (C-
293/12and C-594/12) [2014] E.C.R. I-238; [2014] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 1 
74 Article 15, European Convention on Human Rights. 
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rights law: not rejecting its application and significance, per se, but arguing that it 
required adjustment and high levels of tolerance for national counter-terrorism 
activity given the ‘new’ threat posed by ‘radical Islamist’ international terrorism. 
This form of human rights exceptionalism was in some ways subtle: there was no 
wholesale rejection of human rights law as “quaint” or inappropriate, but rather an 
effective attempt to reshape those human rights standards to create significant space 
for security action ‘at home’ even in the absence of a derogation under Article 15. 
Indeed, so complete was the European Court of Human Rights’ apparent acceptance 
of the thrust of this argument that it has even been characterised as having appeased 
the United Kingdom in its ‘War on Terrorism’ jurisprudence. 
When it comes to activities outside of the UK, however, the Labour government’s 
approach was a full-frontal attack on the applicability of human rights law. This was 
evident in the UK’s (unsuccessful) attempt, through an intervention in Saadi v 
Italy,75 to ensure the adjustment of the Chahal principle so that a deporting state 
could ‘balance’ the potential risk the proposed deportee was said to pose to the 
population against the deportee’s absolute right to be free from torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment and punishment under Article 3.76 It also became clear from 
the UK’s stringent attempts to resist the application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to its military activities in Iraq in Al-Jeddah and Al-Skeini, which 
concerned death and detention in Basra.77 Before the European Court of Human 
Rights the UK argued that the European Convention on Human Rights should not 
apply to the activities of British troops in these cases first because they were acting 
under a UN Security Council mandate and thus “not exercising the sovereign 
authority of the United Kingdom”78 and secondly because Basra was not “within the 
jurisdiction”79 of the UK.80 The Court’s finding that the Convention did in fact apply 
led to a backlash that, as we will see in Part II, continues to resonate today. 
In the first nine years of the ‘War on Terrorism’, then, both the Blair and Brown 
governments committed to an approach to counter-terrorism that was focused on                                                         
75 Saadi v Italy (2008) [GC] ECHR 179 37201/06 
76 Ibid. 
77 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2009) [GC] ECHR 408 27021/08; Al Skeini & Ors v United Kingdom 
(2011) [GC] ECHR 1093 55721/07;   
78 Ibid, [97]. 
79 Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights. 
80 Al Skeini, above n 77, [101-102]. 
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prevention, embraced surveillance as a key technique of counter-terrorism, and 
committed to constructing human rights as standards that could be fulfilled by 
proceduralism at home and resisted entirely abroad. In all of this, they had been 
supported by the Conservative Party in opposition, the rare points of Opposition and 
back bench resistance having been leveraged to prevent the extension of pre-trial 
detention to 90 days (as proposed by Brown) or to insist on procedural safeguards 
such as Special Advocates and sunset clauses for controversial provisions. It was this 
counter-terrorism acquis, then, that the Conservative-led government inherited in 
2010. 
 
Part II. THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO COUNTER-TERRORISM 
2010-2017 
 
Theresa May has been a key figure in the crafting and implementation of counter-
terrorism since 2010, first as Home Secretary and latterly as Prime Minister. As 
Home Secretary one of her first actions was to order a comprehensive review of 
counter-terrorism laws and powers.81 The review was wide-ranging, at least as far 
as domestic counter-terrorism law and policy was concerned. It considered pre-
charge detention, stop and search powers, the use of RIPA, measures to deal with 
organisations promoting hatred and violence, control orders, and ‘deportation with 
assurances’. Following extensive consultation, the Review found that 28-day pre-
charge detention, the indiscriminate use of terrorism stop and search powers, the use 
of RIPA by local authorities to investigate low-level offences, and control orders—
all introduced by the previous Labour government—were “neither proportionate 
nor necessary”.82 At the same time, however, the Review recommended that 
government develop and alternative to control orders, rationalise the legal bases for 
accessing communications data, and make “[a] stronger effort to deport foreign 
nationals involved in terrorist activities…fully respecting our human rights 
                                                        
81 Theresa May, Counter-terrorism and Security Powers, (HC Deb 13 July 2010 513(col 797)) as 
promised in the Coalition Agreement, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, (May 2010) 24 
(albeit a document which promised no fewer than 39 policy reviews) (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_
programme_for_government.pdf ) 
82 Ibid, 5. 
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obligations”.83 Despite the rights-based orientation suggested by the review, then, 
the three key themes of prevention, surveillance, and exceptionalism prevailed. 
 
Announcing the outcome of the review, Theresa May echoed the views of many 
critics of New Labour’s approach to counter-terrorism over the preceding decade, 
while nevertheless expressing her confidence in continuing bipartisan consensus on 
key commitments of UK counter-terrorism: 
 
We reviewed counter-terrorism legislation because too much of it was 
excessive and unnecessary. At times it gave the impression of criminalising 
entire communities. Some measures - such as the extraordinary attempt to 
increase the period of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects to 90 days - 
were rightly defeated in Parliament. Others, such as the most draconian 
aspects of control orders, were defeated in the courts. 
 
These measures undermined public confidence. So I am delighted that the 
Leader of the Opposition has made clear that he will support me in 
preventing the excessive use of state power.84 
 
In moving towards a reduction in this “excessive use of state power”, the 
Conservative-led government was acting in a notably changed climate to that in 
which Blair’s Labour had begun its counter-terrorism work in 1997 and following 
the 2001 attacks. Not only were they working within a context already determined 
by the New Labour approach as outlined in Part I, but they also had they to deal 
with two particular legacies of the Labour era. The first was the Iraq Historic 
Allegations Team, established to determine claims of ill-treatment by British 
military activity in Iraq following the Strasbourg decisions in Al-Skeini and Al-
Jeddah discussed above.  The Snowden revelations had made it clear the extent of 
unlawful surveillance led by the United States but undertaken with the assistance 
and complicity of the United Kingdom. Although neither of these related to the 
Conservatives’ actions in governments, it was they that had to deal with the fallout 
from each of them, including increasing resistance to the IHAT and the backlash 
against surveillance powers following the Snowden revelations. Secondly, by the                                                         
83 Ibid, 6 
84 Theresa May, Counter-Terrorism Review (HC Deb 26 January 2011, 522 (col 306)). 
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time the Conservative-led government took over in 2010 the nature of terrorist 
threat had begun to change with the phenomena of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 
online radicalisation, lone wolf actors, and the Islamic State/Daesh becoming 
increasingly prominent with associated variations in the forms and nature of 
terrorist activity that the government was required to confront. Thus, the 
Conservative-led and, later, Conservative governments introduced some variations 
to the legal and policy counter-terrorist environment inherited in 2010 but, in doing 
so, remained committed to prevention, surveillance, and human rights 




Like the Labour government before them, the Conservative-led and Conservative 
governments since 2010 have stressed the importance of preventing terrorism, not 
merely of responding when it arises. In this respect, however, there have been some 
differences in the Conservative approach, although notably the preventive offences 
introduced in the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Terrorism Act 2006, and discussed in 
Part I above, have not been revoked and continue to operate. Unlike the Labour 
government, which concentrated significant effort on empowering long periods of 
detention before trial, the Conservative focus has been more notably on the physical 
exclusion of suspected terrorists than on pre-trial detention per se. As part of the 
2011 review it was decided that the period of pre-trial detention would revert to 14 
days (from 28 days), although the government would be entitled to extend that to 28 
days with parliamentary approval in the event of an emergency. Control orders were 
replaced with Terrorist Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). These 
TPIMs, introduced by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011 were said by the Government to “mark[] a key milestone in the government’s 
programme to rebalance intrusive security powers and increase safeguards for civil 
liberties”.85 Indeed, TPIMs did introduce a less restrictive regime than was applied 
under Control Orders. For example, people subject to a TPIM were to be provided 
with a landline, mobile and access to the internet, although broad geographical 
zones of residence and movement were replaced with tighter geographical                                                         
85 Home Office, Overview of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/terrorism-prevention-and-investigation-measures-
act)(accessed 23 February 2018). 
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limitations and in 2015 the power to require an individual to reside up to 200 miles 
from their home was introduced, together with weapons bans.86 Even with these 
later amendments, however, TPIMs were unquestionably less oppressive and rights-
restricting than control orders, and of considerably less rights-based concern than 
detention under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act had been. However, 
they nevertheless continue the principle that restriction on liberty is a desirable and 
appropriate counter-terrorism measure: a commitment that is fundamentally 
preventative, and which acts as a form of ‘pre-justice’ measure given that there is no 
requirement of a crime having been committed (or at least proved) for a TPIM to be 
imposed. The continuity with the Labour approach, then, is clear. 
 
However, even while the domestic legal provisions for detention without trial 
appeared to contract, the government increased its focus on excluding suspected 
terrorists as well as on restricting their freedom of movement, reflecting the concern 
with people engaging as Foreign Terrorist Fighters. As to exclusion, since 2010 
Theresa May has been resolute in her view that the deportation of suspected 
terrorists is of vital importance and it was the courts’ insistence that this would take 
place only in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights that 
seems to have been the greatest rights-related frustration for her, even leading to 
her claim that rights-commitments enshrined in the European Convention on 
Human Rights were endangering national security. Partly reflecting the centrality 
of deportation with assurances to contemporary counter-terrorism in the UK, David 
Anderson has noted that “[t]he UK is the country in which the most determined 
efforts have been made to devise and apply a rights-compliant policy of DWA”,87 
going on to note the efforts of both Labour and Conservative-led governments to 
develop generic assurances enabling deportation with Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, 
Algeria, Ethiopia, and Morocco. The numbers of deportations are, in fact, low: 
surprisingly so, perhaps, by contrast with the amount of political commentary on the 
importance of the scheme. Anderson reports that a total of 12 people were deported 
pursuant to these generic assurances between 2011 and July 2017.88 
 
                                                        
86 Part 2, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
87 Anderson, above n. 20, [1.3] 
88 Ibid. 
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The concern with exclusion was not only with the exclusion of foreign terrorist 
fighters, however, but also with ensuring that British citizens who have travelled 
abroad for the purpose of engaging with terrorist activity could be excluded. This, of 
course, was part of the attempt to manage the Foreign Terrorist Fighter 
phenomenon. In particular, significant powers of exclusion were introduced in the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, including Temporary Exclusion Orders. 
These Orders enable the Home Secretary to prevent someone who as a right of 
abode89 but is currently outside of the UK,90 from returning to the UK without a 
permit91 (or without having deported92). These Orders can be issued where the 
Home Secretary reasonable suspects that the person in question has been involved in 
terrorism-related activity outside the state93 and that protection of the public 
reasonably necessitates such exclusion,94 and where either judicial authorisation has 
been granted95 or the Home Secretary considers that the urgency of the situation 
requires an Order to be issued without such authorisation.96 Although it would 
appear that this power has been sparingly used since its introduction in 2015,97 it is 
controversial not only because of concerns about its compatibility with international 
and European human rights law, but also because there is a reasonable question as to 
its effectiveness as a mechanism of countering international terrorism.98 However, 
what its introduction shows is a Conservative determination to enshrine in law 
powers that can be deployed for preventative purposes at home; a clear-eyed focus 
on preventing domestic manifestations of international terrorism. In this, of course, it 
shares a rationale with measures such as detention without trial introduced by 
Labour in 2001 and discussed in Part I above. Combined with the power to seize 
travel documents from persons “suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or the                                                         
89 s. 2(6), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
90 s. 2(5), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015., 
91 s. 2(1), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015., 
92 Ibid. 
93 s. 2(3), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015., 
94 s. 2(4), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
95 s. 2(7), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015., 
96 s. 2(8), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015., 
97 Peter Walker, “Rudd admits ant-terror exclusion powers used only once since 2015”, The Guardian, 
29 May 2017. 
98 See generally Guy Goodwin-Gill, “’Temporary Exclusion Orders’ and their Implications for the 
United Kingdom’s International Legal Obligations, Part I”, EJIL: Talk!, 8 December 2014 (available 
at https://www.ejiltalk.org/temporary-exclusion-orders-and-their-implications-for-the-united-
kingdoms-international-legal-obligations-part-i/)  and Helen Fenwick, “Terrorism threats and 
temporary exclusion orders: counter-terrorism rhetoric or reality?” (2017) 3 European Human Rights 
Law Review 247-271.  
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United Kingdom in connection with terrorism-related activity”, also introduced in 
2015,99 Temporary Exclusion Orders amply demonstrate the government’s 
approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters: prevent them from leaving and, if 
unsuccessful, prevent them from returning and, most of all, prevent them for 
engaging in terrorism at home as a result of their activities abroad.  
 
As a strategy, the four headline ‘pathways’ of CONTEST have not changed since its 
inception.  There have, however, been slight shifts since the Conservatives took 
power in 2010, although Prepare and Protect remain largely the same. Although it 
did not happen until the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015, the 
preventative programmes have been translated into statutory duties despite 
widespread criticism and a lack of evidence that the programmes, such as 
CHANNEL, work.  The imposition of reporting duties on education and universities 
is widely considered to conflict with free speech.100  Between 2007 and 2014 80% of 
referrals to the police-led CHANNEL programme were not found to genuinely be at 
risk of being drawn into violent extremism.101 In 2015-2016, only 14% were deemed 
suitable for the programme and only 5% received specialist support.102 Pursue has 
moved into utilising immigration powers such as deportation with assurances, 
passport seizures and exclusion orders outlined above.  Lastly, the later incarnations 
extended special judicial procedures to facilitate the handling of “sensitive and secret 
material to serve the interests of both justice and national security.”103  The closure 
of the courts to open justice principles repeats and confirms the Conservative 
scepticism about the courts.  
 
Alongside the wide ranging investigatory powers outlined below, the Conservatives 
set their sights on counter-extremism measures.  Having established a Tackling                                                         
99 s. 1(1), Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
100 See a letter to the Guardian signed by over 150 academics about the indicators, 29th September 
2016 (available at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/29/anti-radicalisation-strategy-
lacks-evidence-base-in-science); Steve Hewitt, The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism on the Home Front since 9/11 (2008, London: Continuum) 120; Clive Walker ‘War of words 
with terrorism: An Assessment of Three Approaches to Pursue and Prevent’ (2017) 22(3) Conflict and 
Security Law 523-551. 
101 National Police Chief Council Referral Figures (available at 
http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx ) 
102 Home Office, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to 
March 2016, Statistical Bulletin 23/17; Alan Travis, “Only 5% of people referred to Prevent 
extremism scheme get specialist help”, The Guardian, 9th November 2017  
103 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Cm 8123, 2011) para 4.2, 45 
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Radicalisation and Extremism Taskforce in 2013,104 they have made repeated attempts 
to introduce anti-extremism legislation.  Boosted by the 2015 election result, they 
indicated they would introduce a bill to counter “non-violent” extremism.105  A 
further attempt was made in 2016 with a Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill 
but again a full draft was not published.106  The content of both was said to be 
similar, proposing civil measures to ban extremist groups, restrict individuals 
deemed to be extremist, close associated premises and empower OFCOM to censor 
extremist content.107   Both proposals were met with vigorous opposition.108   
 
Clearly extremist views continue to be of concern to the Conservatives, with their 
approach published in a Counter-Extremism Strategy and recently establishing a 
Counter-Extremism Commission.109  The Commission has already been the subject 
of criticism when Sara Khan, who is seen as insufficiently independent, was 
appointed as its lead.110  The Conservative’s overall position on anti-extremism is 
situated in a wider position on ‘British values’ and identity much of which is also 
bundled up in the Brexit vote and subsequent negotiations.  The strategy and 
attempt to legislate seeks to delineate a position of reasonableness from which 
intolerant and extreme views can be judged, but lacking evidence and clear 
argument as to what counts as extreme or how opinion alone leads to violence and 
terrorism.111  Ultimately, the Conservatives are engaging in a misguided effort to 
curtail free speech both on and off-line and alienate particular groups, particularly 
the Muslim community.  As Clive Walker aptly concludes  
 
                                                        
104 Tackling Extremism in the UK: Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation 
and Extremism (2013). 
105 The Queen’s Speech 2015 (27 May 2015).  
106 The Queen’s Speech 2016 (18 May 2016).  
107 David Anderson, Terrorism Act Report 2015 (available at 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Terrorism-
Acts-Report-2015_web-version.pdf ) 
108 Ibid para 9.29, 63-64 
109 HM Government, Counter-Extremism Strategy (2015); Home Office, Factsheet on the Commission for 
Countering Extremism, 25 January 2018 (available at 
https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2018/01/25/factsheet-on-the-commission-for-countering-
extremism/).  
110 Jamie Grierson, “Choice of new UK anti-extremism chief criticised as ‘alarming’”, The Guardian, 25 
January 2018. 
111 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Extremism Second Report of Session 2016-17, 
(HL39, HC105, 22 July 2016), 31. 
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A more palatable political stance is to recognise that extensive criminal 
offences against free speech about terrorism, the regulation of such speech 
activities, and engagement in counter-ideology will not avert all terrorism. 
As a result, the dismal prospect is that current emanations of violent 
extremism will indeed take generations to assuage.”112  
 
The distinct illiberality in the strengthening the Prevent programme and the pursuit 
of ‘deradicalisation’ is striking given the Government’s initial claim in 2011 that it 
would seek to “reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties and roll back state 
intrusion” and would “introduce safeguards against the misuse of anti-terrorism 
legislation.”113 Such safeguards have come in the form of reporting and publishing 




Alongside movement restrictions, exclusion orders and ‘deradicalisation’, the 
Conservative government sought extended surveillance powers. As we have seen, 
the power to retain data was enabled by the EU Data Retention Directive until 2014 
when it was found incompatible with the EU Charter.114  On the heels public enmity 
over the extent of digital surveillance following the 2013 Snowden revelations,115 
Digital Rights Ireland spurred the Conservatives to rush through the Data Retention 
and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) to ensure bulk data retention and 
surveillance powers could continue at least temporarily.116 Although subject to a 
sunset clause,117 the DRIPA’s extension of existing surveillance powers118 
                                                        
112 Clive Walker “War of words with terrorism: An Assessment of Three Approaches to Pursue and 
Prevent” (2017) 22(3) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 523-551, 551. 
113 Review of Counter Terrorism and Security Powers, Cm 8004 (2011), 4. 
114 Digital Rights Ireland above n 73.  
115 Martin Moore ‘RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, and the Inadequacies of our Existing Legal 
Framework’ (2014) 85(2) The Political Quarterly 125-133. 
116 The bill only had 4 days of debate and amendment (the draft was published on 10th July 2014 as 
expedited or fast-tracked legislation and was passed 7th July 2014), 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/dataretentionandinvestigatorypowers/stages.html 
117 DRIPA 2014 s 8(3) meant s 1 to 7 expired on the 31st December 2016 
118 Jemima Kiss, “Academics: UK ‘Drip’ data law changes are ‘serious expansion of surveillance’”, The 
Guardian, 15 July 2014. 
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unsurprisingly invited further challenge in both domestic and EU courts.119  
Undeterred by either legal challenge or public criticism, the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016 largely replicated  DRIPA provisions and further pursued the CONTEST 
agenda’s strengthening and extending surveillance power.120 
 
While governments want to keep pace with technological change, the extension is 
also the result of the Government’s desire to harness the informational power of the 
big communication and technology companies.  The yoking of the internet into 
everyday life created an evidentiary revolution by facilitating a new surveillance 
arena. Accordingly, the IPA was presented as regulatory matching technological 
advances and plugging associated ‘capability gaps’.121 Often referred to as making 
these powers ‘effective’,122 passing these powers quelled government frustration 
with the supra-national legal rulings which had dented previous efforts to extend 
investigatory powers.123 The furore provided an opportunity to surreptitiously 
broaden surveillance powers to allow collection of bulk data sets,124 the deployment 
of ‘thematic’ warrants125  and in Parts 3 and 4 an extended power to gather and 
retain communications data. Currently under review, the powers in Part 3 and 4 also 
broadened which public bodies can collect communications data and for what 
reasons. In addition to the usual crime prevention and national security, the ten 
purposes now include public health protection and functions relating to financial 
stability.126  
 
Of the most worrying powers introduced, ‘equipment interference’ - a statutory 
euphemism for government sanctioned hacking-  outlines one of the key disputes                                                         
119 David Davis & Tom Watson and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 
2092 (Admin); Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v Postoch telestyrelsen and SS for the Home Department v 
Tom Watson et al above n 119.  
120 See CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Counter-Terrorism (Cm 8123, 2011) Part 4, 49. 
121 Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Cm 9152 4 November 2015) (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-investigatory-powers-bill ) 
122 Examples of the language used in relation to the internet and the need to monitor it Intelligence 
and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework 
(2015), 55-6 (available at http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312-ISC_P+S+Rpt(web).pdf ), 
particularly at 9-13 
123 Digital Rights Ireland above n 73; Joined Cases Tele2 Sverige AB v Postoch telestyrelsen and SS for the 
Home Department v Tom Watson et al above n 119. 
124 IPA 2016 Parts 6 and 7 
125 IPA 2016 Part 2, s17 
126 IPA 2016 Part 3 s 61(2) 
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about the Government’s approach to surveillance.127  On the one hand, legislative 
acknowledgment of government hacking is a step towards transparency128; on the 
other, legislation legitimises its use.129  Through EI the security and intelligence 
agencies can access (or interfere with) any data producing electronic, enabling 
intelligence and security agencies to circumvent encryption, if they can break it, by 
issuing a “capability notice” to the provider.130 As with the earlier regulations, the 
use of intercept evidence continues to be excluded,131 except in pretty much all 
counter-terrorism related proceedings, such as the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 
SIAC, the Proscribed Organisation Appeal Commission and in relation to TPIM 
proceedings, Temporary Exclusion Orders and in closed material procedures.132 The 
decision to replicate the ban followed a further review of its use undertaken again by 
Sir John Chilcot.  In his 2014 review he argued that the ban could be overturned but 
only if the evidence were disclosed to the defendants but doing so would be cost 
prohibitive.133   
 
Part 2, covering ‘targeted interception’, updates the RIPA provisions on access to 
communications content and, while it requires adherence to individualised and 
evidenced suspicion,134 can be issued for a wide range of reasons.  The section also 
provides measures to enable ‘Thematic warrants’ allowing groups of individuals to 
be targeted135 where they share ‘a common purpose or… carry on, or may carry on, 
a particular activity’.136 Since the size of the group is undefined and there is no 
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128 David Anderson, ‘The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 – an exercise in democracy’  (available at 
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restriction on targeting a religious group, from the perspective of profiling,137 it is 
possible that a legislative basis for ‘suspect communities’ has been created.138   
 
The ability to target undefined groups is accompanied by Part 6 and 7 powers to 
access bulk data. Part 6 allows access to content as well as metadata of those outside 
the UK and while it is subject to the ‘double lock’ detailed below, the foreign focus 
restriction is a minimal safeguard as UK citizens are easily captured when they 
interact with anyone, business or individual, overseas.139 The provisions in Part 7 
relating to Bulk Personal Data sets (BPDs) of UK residents (personal data relating 
to a large number of people, such as the electoral roll, telephone directories, airline 
passenger manifests) are highly intrusive, as the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) noted: they concern ‘a wide range of individuals, the majority of 
whom are unlikely to be of intelligence interest.’140 It is for these reasons that 
enabling bulk data acquisition garnered the most controversy and critical 
commentary during the passage of the Bill.141 These debates tended to focus on 
threats to press freedom but bulk powers pose a more pervasive threat to freedom in 
general.142 The recommendation of the ISC, the committee best-informed on 
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https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20150714_whr_2-15_a_democratic_licence_to_operate.pdf) 
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surveillance power use, recommended that the power to collect class Bulk Personal 
Data sets be removed, went unheeded.143 
 
The Conservatives have not been entirely successful in their attempt to gain wide 
bulk surveillance powers as the legal challenges to the IPA precursor, DRIPA, reign 
in draconian data retention.  Initially the High Court found DRIPA incompatible 
with EU law.  Key points were subsequently referred to the CJEU which, in a 
combined case, ruled that to be compatible with EU law data access and retention 
had to conform to the Watson requirements: it must be restricted to the purpose of 
fighting serious crime (which DRIPA and the IPA are not), be subject to the prior 
approval of a court or other independent body and ensure that the data is not to be 
transferred outside the EU.144  In applying this judgment to DRIPA, the Court of 
Appeal recently ruled that this meant DRIPA 2014 was incompatible with EU law 
on all three points.  Without amendment Parts 3 and 4 of the IPA 2016 are therefore 
also incompatible, although in response to Watson changes have been tabled.145 A 
further judicial review of bulk surveillance powers is being heard at the courts 
presently.146  
 
In relation to governmental approaches to counter terrorism, the disputes over 
surveillance powers often appear to be happening on two separate plains.  Tom 
Watson MP, the campaign group Liberty, and others who are focused on civil 
liberties and human rights (more on this below) are anxious about government 
surveillance in general regardless of the extent or adequacy of oversight.147  In this 
                                                        
143 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill 
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they are broadly supported by the EU court,  whereas the Government and their 
supporters who are focused on security believe broad surveillance is valuable and 
any discomfort at the extent of the power can be ameliorated by augmenting the 
available safeguards and oversight, i.e. by the proceduralisation of rights protections 
on which we expand further below.   
 
Human Rights Scepticism 
 
Like the Labour governments that preceded them, Conservative-led and 
Conservative governments since 2010 have found themselves occasionally frustrated 
with human rights law. We have already seen that both deportation with assurances 
and data surveillance have at times fallen foul of human rights law—particularly the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights—in both 
domestic and supranational courts. In spite of Theresa May’s championing of 
proportionate, rights-respecting counter-terrorism in the 2011 Review discussed 
above, it has become apparent that there are clear disagreements between her (and 
much of Parliament) and many courts as to what constitutes proportionate, rights-
respecting counter-terrorism. In essence this is a conflict about who should decide: it 
is becoming increasingly clear that many in the Conservative Party consider that 
decisions about rights-compliance should be domestic rather than supranational, and 
political rather than judicial. As Frances Webber has put it, “the current 
Conservative government is changing the meaning of accountability. It is 
increasingly treating compliance with international legal norms and human rights as 
optional.”148 Of course, this is part of a broader working out of contemporary 
constitutional tensions that have persisted since long before the 2011 attacks and 
which are fundamentally focused on questions of constitutional design and authority.  
 
These tensions are not particularly a matter for counter-terrorism, but the extent to 
which the counter-terrorism context has been used as a milieu in which to work out 
these tensions is notable. This is illustrated by the Prime Minister’s continuing 
concern that restrictions on deportation with assurances undermine national 
security in the United Kingdom. Whether that is manifested in her claim, during the                                                                                                                                                               
when-youre-awake/ ); internationally Neil M. Richards ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2015) 
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148 Frances Webber, ‘The inversion of accountability’ (2016) 58(2) Race & Class 55-63. 
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Brexit Referendum, that it was the European Convention on Human Rights rather 
than the European Union that the UK ought to be leaving because the Convention 
“can bind the hands of Parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, makes us less 
secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals”,149 or her 
pledge that “we will never again – in any future conflict – let those activist, left-wing 
human rights lawyers harangue and harass the bravest of the brave – the men and 
women of Britain’s Armed Forces”150 through rights-based litigation for conflict-
related abuses, the Prime Minister’s hostility to international human rights 
supervision has become clear and been clearly lodged in security-related narrative. 
In this, she is hardly alone within her own party, and neither is she indicating clean 
break from the rhetoric of the Labour governments that preceded her. Recall that 
one of Blair’s earliest rights-related interventions following the 11 September 2001 
attacks was to call into question the continuation of the Chahal doctrine—the very 
doctrine that is at the heart of restrictions on deportations with assurances so 
criticised by the Prime Minister—and that it was the Labour governments who 
pursued the early attempt to prevent extra-territorial application of the ECHR in 
Iraq, which has now developed into the proposition from the Conservative 
government of derogating from the ECHR in all future military operations abroad. 
While the Conservative rhetoric on the Convention and the appropriateness of 
applying human rights to restrict counter-terrorism might take on a firmer tone, it 
is contiguous with that which preceded it, indicating a further point of continuity.  
 
So too can continuity be observed in the approach to enhancing human rights 
compliance in counter-terrorism law. In the main the policy objective to be pursued 
is not varied when its tension with human rights law is ascertained, rather the 
operation of the powers is proceduralised. Procedure and procedural protections 
thus replace substantive rights-protections: the intrusion onto substantive rights 
nevertheless takes place. This is an extension of the logic that underpins, for 
example, the Special Advocates system that we have already seen the Labour 
Government adopted in respect of suspected terrorists, and can be widely observed 
in the post-2010 Conservative governments’ measures. As already noted, for 
example, Temporary Exclusion Orders ordinarily require judicial supervision, unless                                                         
149 Theresa May, “The UK, EU and our Place in the World”, Institute of Mechanical Engineers, (25 
April 2016) (available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-
the-uk-eu-and-our-place-in-the-world ) 
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such an Order is urgently required. So too can such proceduralisation be observed in 
the context of surveillance, where introducing ‘safeguards’ was fundamental to the 
passage of new laws.  
 
The IPA safeguards are summarised in the Act’s prime real estate, Part 1 but 
detailed in Part 8, and procedural compliance is not merely best practice but one of 
civil and, for the worst failures, criminal liability. Attempts to circumvent these 
procedures by relying on the broader powers of the Intelligence Services Act, for 
example, are supposedly precluded.151 However, safeguarding bells and whistles are 
undercut because ‘these provisions are not overarching but apply to specified 
activities’.152 Significantly, circumvention protections do not apply to equipment 
hacking or communications data. The attempt then to ‘improve’ and increase 
oversight is superficial as Part 8 only consolidates existing oversight bodies into a 
new Investigatory Powers Commissioner.153 The two-step ‘double-lock’ mechanism 
whereby both the relevant minister and a Commissioner approve warrants before 
they become effectual is not as comprehensive as implied.154 In urgent cases, and 
most cases would likely find the urgency requirement an insignificant hurdle, the 
Judicial Commissioner can review the warrant up to 3 working days after issue.155 
This means that a warrant is not a judicial door that must be unlocked, but simply 
takes the form of retrospective judicial supervision. While more extensive supervision 
is clearly overdue, the measure presented here is disappointingly feeble,156 not least 
because Judicial Commissioners are not ‘courts’ or even ‘judges’ in this context 
(although they must be former or serving members of the Judiciary), but rather a 
separate category of quasi-judicial oversight appointed and regulated by the IPA 
2016.     
 
Part III.  A CONSERVATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM? 
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While there is plenty to be concerned about from a human rights perspective in the 
post-2010 counter-terrorism law and policy pursued by the Conservative and 
Conservative-led governments, in the main this law and policy continues trends and 
foci that were evidence in the New Labour approach to counter-terrorism from 1997 
and particularly since 2001. This is not to say, however, that the underpinnings of 
these approaches are the same.  
 
The Conservatives’ approach to counter-terrorism will inevitably have been shaped 
by their pragmatic and reactionary world view, evident across all three periods of 
Conservative Party activity and ideological development in the late 20th and early 
21st Century: the return to a Disraelian ‘one nationism’ following Thatcher’s neo-
liberalism,157 Cameron’s austerity-laced ‘big society’ progressive neo-liberalism (i.e. 
a modernising Gladstonian Liberalism),158 and finally May’s social “meritocratic” 
conservatism, which Adrian Pabst argues represents a new ‘postliberal’ position,159 
albeit being distracted from by negotiations with the EU.  Across all of these stages, 
there has been little change to the Conservative Party’s approach to counter-
terrorism, which in turn has attracted a degree of bipartisan agreement reminiscent 
of the post-war consensus.160    
 
Such continuity is partly predictable. For conservative thinkers, a c/Conservative 
‘ideology’ would be partly antithetical to its core values.  Conservatives are 
inevitably anti-ideological precisely because they are anti-idealist.  They are wary of 
utopian pursuits forsaking all existing structures and defensive of social and political 
traditions. Much of modern conservatism takes its lead from Edmund Burke who 
argued that revolutionaries and idealists invert the relationship between practice and                                                         
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160 David Dutton, British Politics Since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus, 2nd ed. London; 
Blackwell 1997)); Dennis Kavanagh ‘The Postwar Consensus’ (1992) 3(2) Twentieth Century British 
History 175–190. 
 30 
theory. For Burke, theory should not guide practice, but practice develop theory. He 
explained 
  
to take the theories which learned and speculative men have made from that 
government, and then, supposing it made on those theories which were made 
from it, to accuse that government as not corresponding with them.161 
 
Accordingly, the ‘continuity’ between New Labour and post-2010 Conservative-led 
and Conservative approaches to counter-terrorism connects with the belief in 
maintaining the status quo and a preference for reflecting on existing customs rather 
than theorising new approaches that have not been tested. Scruton explains this as 
an inability “to appeal to any future that is not already present and past”.162 This 
approach reflects the Burkean roots of modern conservative thought which 
developed as a “defence of tradition against the calls for popular sovereignty”.163 It is 
also a reaction against the privileging of rights over authority. Individual liberty, 
conceived of either as rights or as civil liberties, is not, in the Conservative 
viewpoint, absolute but subject to established government authority which 
maintains political customs and institutions that presuppose “general connivance.”164 
In other words, obedience to national authority which is undermined by having a set 
of rights enshrined at supra-national level and restricting the Government’s ability 
to apply its authority in certain areas such as deportation and passport seizure. 
 
Of course, obedience and control could sit at odds with free market ideas and the 
development of New Right neo-conservatism.  But this perspective can be explained 
by Conservatives’ scepticism of rationalist principles that generate from abstract 
constructions of the world.165  Michael Oakeshott explained that a plan to “resist all 
planning may be better than its opposite” but it is nonetheless part and parcel of the 
same attempt to construct a “self-conscious ideology” that Conservative thinkers 
would rather avoid.166 It is, therefore, quite consistent and perhaps expected for                                                         
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conservatism to have maintained a commitment to the three basic themes of post-
1997 counter-terrorism identified in Part I of this paper (prevention, surveillance, 
and human rights exceptionalism) even while purporting to enhance liberty in the 
face of disproportionate counter-terrorism laws and policies and particularly to be 
expected that, in doing it, Conservatives would tend towards seeing national 
authorities as those that should determine the question of proportionality. 
 
Scepticism over rights in the counter-terrorism context appears to play out 
somewhat more easily for Conservatives than it did for New Labour. The 
revolutionary zeal of the Blair government for constitutional reform was evident 
right from the beginning of its term in 1997, and such reform was dramatic: the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the establishment of the UK Supreme Court, together 
with substantial devolution to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales transformed 
the UK constitutional landscape.167 In this context, one might perhaps have 
expected a departure from rights-repression in the context of counter-terrorism, but 
no such departure was in evidence. While the Labour government ‘normalised’168 
counter-terrorism powers through the Terrorism Act 2000 we have already seen 
that it did so in a manner that was heavily oriented towards prevention and that 
tended to embed, rather than question, the rights-limiting approach to counter-
terrorism that had been evident in the law as it applied to Northern Ireland. 
Furthermore, this approach was congruent with the broader Labour move to use 
quasi-criminal instruments and early or remote criminalisation as a means of 
addressing difficult public order issues, from anti-social behavior to terrorism-
related activity.169 
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Labour was, of course, making decisions in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks and, subsequently, the attacks on central London in July 2005. There can be 
little doubt that the convergence of popular and elite demands for responses, 
security and power that follows attacks will have had an impact on the Blair 
government;170 indeed, this was clear from the Prime Minister’s frequent references 
to what police and security forces ‘needed’ to ensure security when proposing 
repressive measures such as extended detention without charge.171 The government 
may well have reasonably expected that such measures would be greeted with high 
levels of deference by the courts, accustomed as we are to courts conceding to the 
greater authority of the political branches in the context of security crises. However, 
while there were certainly some examples of deference (at national and European 
level), courts were perhaps surprisingly non-deferential towards the state in 
counter-terrorism contexts, pushing back against key powers, often by relying on 
the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.172 Scepticism towards the courts in 
the counter-terrorist context consequently developed among many in Labour. This 
should not, however, be considered overly surprising: like Conservatives, the Left 
has long been scetpical of courts, but for different reasons. For the Left, courts are 
often viewed with suspicion, characterised as the preserve of the elite.173 Even if, as 
Ewing has argued, the apparent non-deference of the courts did little, in real terms, 
to help people who were at the end of the sharpness of counter-terrorism law,174 it 
certainly disrupted some of the Labour government’s approach to counter-terrorism, 
laying conditions for security-related courts-scepticism that, while often different in 
ideological source from those Conservatives, created a further point of bipartisan 
consensus on the governance of counter-terrorism. 
 
Does this mean that there is nothing that we can discern or characterise as a 
Conservative counter-terrorism? Partially. Certainly, the rationales that underpin 
post-2010 approaches to counter-terrorism do seem to have a Conservative 
particularity. The construction of prevention as a duty of the state rather than an                                                         
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approach to government reflects a Conservative commitment to paternalistic 
statehood undertaken for the good of the populace. As David Willets said as a young 
MP, Conservatives would rather “trust in community, with its appeals to deference, 
to convention and to authority”175 than in law, rights, or courts. For many 
Conservatives, this simply reflects a belief in what Omand has called “securitas”:176 
the public value of security in which protecting the state is co-extensive with 
individual rights rather than justified by them.  
 
Anticipatory approaches appeal to the sense of a community that needs to be 
protected from harm, even if sometimes that itself produces harm. While this may 
seem to chime obviously with Thatcherite and Mayist approaches to neo-liberal 
thinking, it is just as true for Cameron’s apparent progressivism. He insisted that 
rather than trying to “turn the clock back”, Conservatives wanted to know “what has 
been done which is good and we can build on”.177 Cameron repeated the language of 
looking backwards and deferring to convention, not presenting a radical agenda. 
Progressivism may have appeared to be a “significant change of direction” and a 
“rediscovery of progress as social justice”178 but this was largely rhetorical; 
‘progressive’ Conservative actions mark them as only pursuing social justice as “part 
of a change of image, not substantively of policy or ideology”.179 This is as evident in 
counter-terrorism as in any other field of activity. 
 
The rebranding of control orders into TPIMs, the maintenance of the broad shape of 
CONTEST, and the extension of surveillance, while continuing a New Labour 
policy, is not the result of a revelatory moment for Conservative thinking.  May’s 
overall Conservative agenda, dropping some of the language of progression found in 
Cameron’s approach, embodies a more traditional social stance.  The counter-
terrorism agenda renewed its focus on counter-extremism with the introduction of 
the Counter Extremism Strategy and much criticised Counter Extremism Bill.                                                         
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These measures illuminate how Conservatism “in its most recent attempt to define 
itself, has become the champion of Western civilisation against its enemies…political 
correctness…and religious extremism, especially militant Islamism.”180  In so doing, 
it is fulfilling a key Tory value as a defending, or rather conserving “the political 





The intrusion on rights that emerges from counter-terrorism has long been clear, 
and remains a cause for concern. As the nature of terrorist activities continues to 
shift over time, focusing more and more in Europe on so-called ‘lone wolf’ and low-
tech attacks and on online engagement for organisation and radicalisation, we can 
expect the legal and policy frameworks that are applied to counter terrorism also to 
adapt. It is difficult to see, based on the patterns already outlined, if and how a 
dissensus in approach might emerge that would fundamentally challenge 
commitment to the three core planks of prevention, surveillance and rights 
scepticism that pervade UK counter-terrorism even if—as does sometimes happen—
there are sometimes disagreements on the edges about, for example, nature and 
frequency of oversight.  
 
This has led to a notable continuity across decades and governments; a continuity 
that can be explained in Conservative thought only if, as Kekes says, the system has 
historically been conducive to good lives in the counter-terrorism context. However, 
we cannot say with any certainty that this is the case, particularly given the 
readiness of some government units to accept a history of failing to anticipate risk. 
The Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, supplying evidence to the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, conceded “we did fail to look 
ahead far enough and we did fail to see the rise of ISIL”, and this after “failing to see 
the rise of Al-Qaeda.”182 Continuity in the fact of this might be explained by a 
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Conservative acceptance of imperfectionism,183 but it may also reflect an 
unwillingness to look for counter-terrorism methods that do not purloin rights or 
undo open justice. That latter characteristic is, we argue, shared across Labour and 
Conservative governments of the past twenty years.  
 
This leaves one then to wonder what the future of counter-terrorism in the UK 
might be. There is no indication that prevention, surveillance, and human rights 
exceptionalism might be shifted from their central location within the counter-
terrorist context. In For the Many, Not the Few Corbyn’s Labour pledged to “always 
provide our security agencies with the resources and the powers they need to protect 
our country and keep us all safe” while “ensur[ing] that such powers do not weaken 
our individual rights or civil liberties”;184 to engage in investigatory powers that are 
“both proportionate and necessary”185 and to “reintroduce effective judicial oversight 
over how and when they are used”.186 While Prevent would be reviewed “with a view 
to assessing both its effectiveness and its potential to alienate minority 
communities”, it was not to be abandoned; indeed, a Labour government would 
“address the government’s failure to take any effective new measures against a 
growing problem of extreme or violent radicalisation”.187 While Labour’s vision 
accepts the ability of its counter-terrorist measures to isolate, the distance from the 
Conservative perspective is not that great. The Conservatives’ Forward Together 
pledged more funding for counter-terrorism and security,188 new criminal offences 
and aggravated offences to tackle extremism (singling out “Islamist extremism” in 
particular),189 and to establish the Commission for Countering Extremism, which 
they did in January 2018.   
 
Unfortunately, nothing in this suggests a change of direction, not to mention the 
radical rupturing of the current counter-terrorist consensus and embrace of a 
dispositional shift towards security, risk, and rights that would be needed effectively 
to break the counter-terrorism consensus and continuity in approach outlined here.                                                          
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